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ABSTRACT
Since results have been equivocal about the relationship between 
religion and moral judgment, this study was undertaken to determine 
whether there was evidence for the relationship, using a multitrait - 
multisource technique. Criticisms of Kohlberg's theory of moral 
development were reviewed in regard to the issue. Teacher, self, and 
peer ratings were obtained on scales of religiousness, moral judgment, 
and social skill, which was included as a discriminant variable. A 
pilot group of 67 eighth graders was assessed to determine the relia­
bility of the rating scales. Thirty-four eighth graders in the sample 
completed the religiousness, moral judgment, and social skills rating 
scales as well as the Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgment 
and the Religious Belief Questionnaire (RBQ). Pearson product moment 
correlations were determined among the variables, and the correlations 
from the rating scales were examined in a multitrait-multisource 
matrix. Results supported the hypotheses that there would be a posi­
tive relationship, statistically significant at the .05 level, between 
religiousness and moral judgment, especially when individuals are 
rated regarding these characteristics by other people. Though the DIT 
and the RBQ failed to correlate at a statistically significant level, 
the DIT did correlate significantly with self ratings of religious­
ness .
Social skill was found to correlate with religion and, even more
viii
so, to moral judgment, in much the same way that religiousness and 
moral judgment related to each other. A partial correlation con­
trolling for the effect of social skills revealed that the relation­
ship between teacher ratings of religiousness and moral judgment 
remained at a statistically significant level, whereas the correla­
tions between students' ratings of religiousness and moral judgment 
were nonsignificant when the effects of social skills were controlled.
Gender differences in peer ratings were examined. Girls' 
ratings of other girls were significantly higher than were girls' 
ratings of boys and boys' ratings of other boys on religion, social 
skills, and moral judgment. This finding was consistent with 
previous research.
INTRODUCTION
"It is important that as few people as possible should think 
about morality - consequently it is very important that morality 
should not one day become interesting" (Nietzsche, 1886). In spite 
of Nietzsche's wishes, morality, which has long been a subject of 
philosophical inquiry, has become a serious topic of thought and in­
vestigation by psychologists, especially in the last decade. Before 
1970 there was no listing in the Psychological Abstracts for either 
morality or moral development.
The reluctance to investigate this area can be attributed in 
part to an emphasis on empirical methods and a reaction to psycho­
dynamic notions of superego and conscience. Ossowska (1970) states:
How can we explain this lack of interest in problems as 
fascinating as these are? Are we reluctant to discuss 
problems so emotionally loaded or so deeply integrated into 
our personality? Perhaps we are skeptical as to the possi­
bility of studying moral problems in a scientific way 
because of the vagueness of the concept of morality. But 
concepts of religion, art, and law are no less controversial.
Robinson and Shaver (1969) concur:
Many psychologists consider value judgments outside the 
boundaries of empirical discipline. They seem to have 
confused making value judgments, which is incompatible 
with scientific objectivity, with studying objectively how 
other people make them - a phenomenon as amenable to psy­
chological study, in principle, as other forms of human 
learning and choice.
There has been increasing recognition that moral reasoning plays 
a significant part in people's lives. The impact that moral
1
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reasoning and behavior have on mental health has been cited by many. 
DeMenasce (1961) has asserted, "Every psychosis seems to be a behav­
ioral complex that is derived more or less distantly, from an insur­
mountable contradiction in the face of ethical behavior." Jung (1933) 
has observed the importance of moral reasoning as well as the signifi­
cance of the related area of religion; moral reasoning and religion 
are the two areas the present study proposes to examine. Jung has 
written:
Among all my patients in the second half of my life - there 
has not been one whose problem in the last resort was not 
that of finding a religious outlook on life. The modern 
attempt to uproot the objective basis of religion and 
ethics, to reduce man to a bundle of nonmoral complexes 
has driven men in upon their subjectivity and severed 
them from the rational and moral order on which human 
value depends. Such a despair about the worthwhileness 
of moral ideals, such a disbelief in a personal God 
behind the moral order, was bound to have a potent influ­
ence in modifying human conduct. The more sensitive, 
feeling the strain of an impoverished humanity, seek 
vainly from psychotherapists the answer to metaphysical 
problems, in many cases only to emerge as dehumanized 
animals.
Approaches to the Study of Moral Development
Given the importance of moral reasoning then, examination will 
now be made of the approaches to the moral development process, 
especially of the cognitive-developmental school of thought which 
emphasizes age and cognitive changes as influences on moral develop­
ment . Piaget and Kohlberg are the leading proponents of this school.
A second approach is that of social learning theory, which stresses 
environmental and socialization influences (Hoffman, 1970). Freudian 
or psychoanalytic thought is sometimes cited as a separate theory 
but has also been subsumed under a broadly defined social learning
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approach (Windmiller, 1980). The basic difference between the two 
approaches is the greater emphasis assigned to autonomous cognitive 
processes or social inputs to moral growth (Wilson & Schochet, 1980). 
Piaget's Theory of Moral Development
Actually, Piaget's theory of moral development is interactive 
since it recognizes the importance of cognitive development and social 
experience, both of which have been shown to accelerate progress 
through the moral stages. Piaget's oft-quoted central pronouncement 
is, "All morality consists in a system of rules, and the essence of 
all morality is to be sought for in the respect which the individual 
acquires for these rules" (1972). Piaget's notion is that the child 
generates rules from an understanding of the social situation, that 
the child's understanding changes in a step-wise fashion, and that the 
process is universal (Windmiller, 1980). Piaget thought that the 
child shifted from respect and submission to authority, in heterono- 
mous morality, to self-government and control, in autonomous morality 
(Hoffman, 1970). The first stage is characterized by obligation to 
rules, consideration of the consequences of an act in determining its 
moral value, and a tendency to see behaviors as totally right or wrong. 
The later stage is marked by cooperation, reciprocal agreement with 
others, and awareness of intentionality.
Kohlberg's Extension of Piaget1s Theory
Kohlberg has extended Piaget's theory into a three-level, six- 
stage developmental system. The first premoral or preconventional 
level is characterized by external control, awareness of obedience and 
punishment, and hedonistic and instrumental reasoning. The second
4
level of conventionality or role-conformity is marked by maintenance 
of the conventional social order, maintaining good relations with 
others, doing duty, showing respect, and considering intentions of 
others. The highest level of self-accepted moral principles or post- 
conventional thought consists of the morality of contract, individual 
rights, and democratic law and proceeds ultimately to individual 
principles of conscience. Though the description of Kohlberg's 
scheme has changed somewhat over the years (Siegal, 1980), the most 
recent statement of his moral stages is given in Appendix I (Kohlberg, 
1981).
Kohlberg's Contributions - The Importance of His Theory
Kohlberg's theory is indubitably the preeminent one in the field
at present. His conception is thorough and encompases the life span
from early childhood to adult maturity. His work has stimulated much
further research. Many agree with Peters (1971) that Kohlberg's work
seems "by far the most important which has been done to date."
Kohlberg has been praised for his conceptual analysis, developmental
perspective, and sophisticated and reliable instrumentation (Sullivan,
Beck, Joy, & Pagliuso, 1975). "The power of his analysis stems from
his ability to combine philosophy, psychology, education, political
science, etc. within the purview of his extensive empirical work"
(Sullivan, 1977). Alston (1971) credits Kohlberg:
. . . for doing some very hard and very unfashionable 
thinking on moral thought as a subject of interest in its 
own right, and for producing evidence that should force 
psychologists to take the cognitive aspects of morality 
seriously as an important influence on behavior.
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Criticisms of Kohlberg's Theory
Yet there have been many criticisms as well of Kohlberg's theory.
It is the view of some (Peters, 1971) that "Kohlberg adopts too simple 
and too monolithic an approach to moral development" and that "there 
is much more to morality than is covered by his theory." Kohlberg's 
notions have been challenged on philosophical grounds (Hoffman, 1977, 
1979) "for having a Western, a male, and a 'romantic individualistic' 
bias" (Samson, 1978; Simpson, 1974). Peters (1975) noted that 
Kohlberg "suffers from the rather touching belief that a Kantian type 
of morality, represented in modern times most notably by Hare and Rawls, 
is the only one." Sullivan (1975, 1977) concurs that Kohlberg's stage 
theory of moral development "masks an unreflective liberal ideology." 
For example, Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning have been shown to 
relate to political ideology (Fishkin, Keniston, & MacKinnon, 1973; 
Fontana & Noel, 1973; Haan, Smith, & Block, 1968). The important 
philosophical problems with Kohlberg's theory have also been much dis­
cussed by Trainer (1977).
Sane observers have objected to the hierarchical nature of the 
stages proposed by Kohlberg, as well as the invariance of their 
sequence, their universality, order, and homogeneity (Fraenkel, 1976; 
Hoffman, 1977; Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Phillips & Kelly, 1975).
Sullivan (1977) contends "that in Kohlberg the moral thought structures 
(i.e., stages) become reified; that is, take on a life of their own." 
Kohlberg (1973) has presented arguments for the moral superiority of 
his highest stages, yet Alston (1971) has shown that logical depend­
ence of one stage upon another does not imply greater relative worth
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of the higher stage. Fraenkel (1976) has charged that the highest 
principled stage six has been identified with only three people,
Kohlberg himself, one of his graduate students, and Martin Luther King. 
Gibbs (1977) notes that the "apparent rarity of the principled orienta­
tions is evidence against their significance as part of a Piagetian 
stage sequence."
The "bag of virtues" approach to building moral character by incul­
cating traits which are generally considered to be positive has been 
roundly criticized by Kohlberg (1981). He argues that only the form 
of reasoning is important and that a particular stage of reasoning 
could embody opposite choices. Yet Alston (1971), Peters (1971), and 
Sullivan (1977) have given a more balanced treatment to moral virtues 
as having a place in moral psychology. Alston (1971) notes that 
"morality is content as well as form, and to understand a particular 
person's moral character we need to know both." Wright (1971) concurs 
that, "It is not unreasonable to suppose that why a person thinks an 
action is wrong is much less important than that he thinks it wrong." 
Candee (1976) has concluded that "ultimately structure jLs related to 
choice" and that the "stages would be of little interest if they did 
not lead to specific types of decisions."
Critics of Kohlberg also see as important the place of habit in 
the moral life. Peters (1971) accuses Kohlberg of not taking "good- 
boy" Stage 3 morality seriously enough, and he points out that the 
learning of rules must precede autonomous moral functioning. Kohlberg's 
idea that moral development does not depend upon teaching is also 
questioned.
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The theory has been criticized as well for neglecting motivation 
(Hoffman, 1977; Peters, 1971) "which may be needed for translating 
moral concepts into moral action." Straughan (1975) finds the clash 
between principle and inclination a more common and central conflict 
than the conflict between principles which is so often used in hypothe­
tical moral dilemmas.
Affective elements in moral development have been displaced by 
the greater emphasis on the cognitive role in Kohlberg's theory, to its 
great loss according to Alston (1971) and Peters (1971). They maintain 
that Freud and his superego theory provide much-needed supplementation 
to Kohlberg's work.
Other researchers have cited Kohlberg's method and instrumenta­
tion for psychometric deficiencies, such as the intuitive derivation 
of the stages, the lack of standardization, undemonstrated reliability, 
and questionable predictive and construct validity (Kurtines & Greif, 
1974). Fraenkel (1976) noted Rest's (1974) conclusion that "there are 
almost limitless formats for collecting moral judgment data."
DePalma & Foley (1975) have noted that:
Kohlberg's method produces material that is not strictly com­
parable from subject to subject. The assessments are 
vulnerable to interviewer and scorer biases, and scoring 
the material involves complex interpretations and rather 
great inferential leaps from the data.
In addition, the test-retest reliability was poor in several studies,
and the measure correlated only moderately with similar measures. It
is to Kohlberg's credit that he has greatly revised his scoring system
in light of such criticisms (Colby et al., 1983).
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Religion in Relation to Kohlberg's Theory of Moral Development
Gutkin and Suls (1979) raised "the question of whether tests of
moral reasoning may be biased against those who strongly ensorse the
legitimacy of law rather than personal conviction." They recommended
examining "the extent to which our measures of moral reasoning may
carry unnecessary ideological baggage." In his critical analysis of
Kohlberg's contributions Trainer (1977) noted: "Kohlberg's analysis
makes very little mention of religious principles, which one would
expect to encounter frequently in moral thought, and it is not clear at
which stage such references should be located." From a scientific
standpoint this objection is not valid unless it can be shown that
religion is integral to morality. Still, Trainer's viewpoint and
remarks merit consideration. It was Trainer's (1977) judgment that;
The (Kohlberg) scheme has a 'secular' or humanistic flavour.
Moral maturity is described in terms of reasoned, self­
chosen principles which focus on justice and equality, not 
in terms of willing obedience or humility before an omnis­
cient being. Kohlberg does not explain whether, and if so 
how, a religious person could exhibit mature moral thought.
Stage 6 does not seem to represent what would be regarded as 
moral maturity by, for instance, a Catholic. . . No 
reasoning involving unsanctified principles (and these 
include many . . . religious . . . principles) can rate as 
good moral reasoning regardless of how erudite and cogent 
that reasoning is. Good reasoning is defined in terms of 
the right content, not in terms of facility in a process 
of inquiry.
Indeed, when speaking of conscience, Kohlberg cites the example 
that for a Jehovah's Witness, conscience may mean God's law as inter­
preted by his religious group. However, he notes that, "To count as 
postconv^ntional, such ideas or terms must be used in a way that makes 
it clear that they have a foundation for a rational or moral
individual who has not yet committed himself to any group or society 
or its morality" (Kohlberg, 1973).
Alston (1971) reports that;
Many philosophers who are surely at least as conceptually sophisticated 
as Kohlberg's stage 6 subjects take positions in moral phi­
losophy that reflect stage 4 or 5. Many highly sophisticated 
theologians, for example, have espoused a subjection-to-the 
will-of-God morality that I suppose would be classed by 
Kohlberg as stage 4.
The issues of ends, goals, purposes, and ultimate meanings are included 
in a religious perspective which Kohlberg " . . .  separates from 
morality and therefore justice. It therefore does not enter systema­
tically in his thinking about a just social order" (Sullivan, 1977).
The adoption of a Kantian, liberal socia1-contract theory has 
excluded other systems of ethics which have a transcendent religious 
perspective (Sullivan et al., 1975). Crittenden (1972) states the 
following about the Kohlberg theory:
It involves the rejection of various positions that make some 
claim to be moral as, for example, moral conventionalism, 
religiously based morality, . . . any system that appeals to 
absolute moral standards, the view that there are certain 
actions one is never justified in doing regardless of the 
consequences.
Others have stated unequivocally that Kohlberg's "conceptions
are judged to be at great variance with the traditional Christian
understanding of morality" (Dykstra, 1978). One example is shown in
Kohlberg's endorsement of the early Platonic view (1981) that, "He
who knows the good chooses the good." Yet Kattsoff (1965) reflects:
A person can will to do evil while knowing full well what 
he does and that he is wrong in doing it. Too often we feel 
that to know what is right is to do it, and we assume that 
a person who does evil does it because he is not really 
cognizant of its evil. This was the Greek view; it is not
10
the Christian view.
Hogan (1973) has commented:
Philosophers have typically maintained that neither the ethics 
of personal conscience or the ethics of social responsibility 
represents a necessarily higher form of morality, and that 
the two viewpoints are equally defensible on moral grounds.
Within psychology, however, there seems to be a tendency to 
assign greater virtue to moral judgments based on the dictates 
of personal conscience.
In researching these dimensions Hogan found that those following the 
ethics of personal conscience tended to be progressive, rebellious, 
and unconventiona1 with a tendency toward social activism, while per­
sons espousing the ethics of social responsibility were good-natured, 
thoughtful, well-socialized, and somewhat conservative politically.
Kohlberg remains adamant that religion has little or no relation 
to moral judgment (1967, 1981). But the data contributing to this 
opinion of his are nowhere to be found in his own work. The assertion 
that religion and moral development are unrelated is more than just 
a passing observation of Kohlberg's. Indeed, the strict independence 
of moral life from religious teachings and beliefs is an essential 
factor in Kohlberg's educational proposals. The complete separation 
of moral and religious education has been used by Kohlberg to circum­
vent the Supreme Court decision that Secular Humanism or Ethical 
Culture is a religion and that the credos of such value systems should 
be prohibited from state propagation in the public schools (Kohlberg, 
1967). Kohlberg has largely succeeded in his persuasion and has imple­
mented his programs of value clarification or moral development 
stimulation in many school systems.
Of course, such utter estrangement of morality and religion is
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seen as untenable by many moral philosophers and researchers 
(O'Rahilly, 1955). Ossowska (1970) has theorized four ways that 
morality depends upon religion; moral codes are believed by many to 
be given to man by a supernatural being who is a lawgiver and judge; 
there is a logical dependence of moral precepts on one side and reli­
gious dogmas on the other; there is an influence of religion on the 
content of seme moral convictions; and behavior often depends upon 
one's creed. Another writer has suggested that, "The attempt of 
modern psychologists and psychiatrists to condemn morality and reli­
gion, without bothering to investigate these subjects on their own 
merits, is merely an exhibition of irrational dogmatism" (O'Rahilly, 
1955).
In the 1981 Annual Review of Psychology Leona Tyler notes:
Psychological interest in religious experience has been 
legitimized with the formation of APA Division 36. Such 
experience is, of course, a fundamental aspect of human 
life down through the centuries, going back through history 
and prehistory to the time of our remote ancestors. Anthro­
pologists and philosophers have done research on it. There 
seems no good reason for psychologists to avoid it. Because 
moral codes, patterns of social organization, attitudes, 
and self concepts are linked to religious beliefs, knowl­
edge about them seems important when we try to understand 
a society that is foreign to us. But it is more difficult 
to study religion in our diverse, highly secularized society.
The fact that Freud and many other influential thinkers 
considered religion to be an illusion that should be out­
grown as rapidly as possible in our scientific age also 
contributes to the reluctance psychologists have felt to 
deal with i t .
But Kohlberg "can conclude that religion is not a necessary or 
highly important condition for the development of moral judgment and 
conduct" (Kohlberg, 1967). He argues further that "formal religious 
education has no specifically important or unique role to play in
12
moral development as opposed to the role of the public school and the 
family in this area."'*' In support of his view that moral principles 
are independent of religious belief, Kohlberg even invokes the name 
of St. Thomas Aquinas, a twist which Thomists (Bourke, 1947; Maritain, 
1942) might consider captious and sophistic reasoning.
Eknpirical Support for Kohlberg's Position Regarding Religion and Moral 
Judgment
Turiel (1976), an associate of Kohlberg's, provided support for 
the supposed lack of relationship between religion and moral judgment.
He found that among 104 boys and 106 girls from the sixth, ninth, and 
twelfth grades, those in a progressive school setting earned higher 
moral maturity scores (M=3.16) than subjects from a traditional school 
(M=3.03), who themselves had higher scores than those in a parochial 
school (M=2.82). There was a statistically significant main effect for 
school setting (£<.001). Rest (1979a) reported that moral development 
level is unrelated to either frequency of church attendance or religious 
denomination. Wahrman (1981) assessed 60 orthodox religious college 
students, 31 liberal students, and 33 nondenominational undergraduates 
with the Rokeach Dogmatism Scale and Rest's Defining Issues Test 
and interpreted his findings in support of Kohlberg's theory. He found 
that frequency of attendance at religious services (r=.012) and number 
of years of religious education (£=0 .2 0 ) were not significantly related
^Kohlberg contradicts his argument in another article in which he 
excludes even the family's role, stating categorically that "family 
participation is not unique or critically necessary for moral develop­
ment" (Haan, Langer, & Kohlberg, 1976).
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to moral development.
In a group of young adults Blackner (1975) also failed to find a 
relationship between principled level of moral development and degree 
of involvement in weekly religious education. In another study among 
481 college students, moral judgment was found to be strongly and nega­
tively related to both religious and political orientations (Sanderson, 
1974). This finding was said to confirm the Kohlberg hypothesis that 
the higher a person's stage of moral judgment, the greater is the 
likelihood of his rejection of both orthodox religiosity and right 
wing politics.
Empirical Support for the Relation of Religion to Moral Judgment
The following study ostensibly provided support for the lack of 
relationship between religion and moral judgment, yet it resulted in 
much evidence for the relationship. Armsby (1971) studied 240 children 
and attested that Catholic school children were no more likely than 
public school children to make intentionality judgments in response to 
revised Piaget story-pairs. What Armsby failed to emphasize in his 
findings was that Catholic school children aged six to eight did make 
intentionality judgments significantly more often than did public 
school children of the same age to standard Piaget stories. The Piaget 
stories are regarded as standard not from a psychometric standpoint 
but from repeated usage by developmental psychologists with many dif­
ferent kinds of subjects. In the Armsby study Catholic students were 
superior on the standard instrument, but their higher levels were not 
apparent on the measure that the researcher himself devised. Despite
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these results, the researcher somehow concluded that he could discon- 
firm the hypothesis that Catholic children would make more mature moral 
judgments than public school children.
In forming this hypothesis, Armsby had drawn upon Boehm's (1962, 
1963) findings that Catholic school children do make more mature 
moral judgments by Piagetian criteria to Piagetian stories than do 
public school children. She found that Catholic parochial school 
children, regardless of socioeconomic class or intelligence level, 
scored higher at an earlier age than public school children in recog­
nizing the distinction between motivation and results of an action and 
in independence from adults and peer reciprocity.
Fifteen years later Killeen (1978) found similar results among 
adolescents, using Rest's Defining Issues Test and a measure of con­
creteness and abstractness of religious thinking. She found statis­
tically significant differences in the levels of moral and religious 
judgments between public and Catholic school adolescents who were formal 
thinkers. Her conclusion was that "Catholic school adolescents 
attained higher scores in principled moral judgment and abstract reli­
gious thinking, indicating that exposure to direct moral training based 
on religious beliefs directs and informs judgment which enables formal 
thinkers to make discriminating, precise, and higher level moral 
choices." This conclusion is met with some reservations since Killeen 
is inferring causation from her results. In a study of 630 high school 
students Robinson (1976) concurred that students from a Catholic high 
school learning environment have better moral reasoning abilities than 
do public high school students, and that changes in moral development
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are more likely to occur in the Catholic high school than in the public 
school.
There is evidence as well among Protestant groups who were studied 
that religious thinking relates to moral development. For example, 
Miller (1976) found "a significant relationship at the .05 level of 
confidence between stages of moral development and stages of religious 
thinking." He had studied 94 subjects aged eight to eighteen in Bible 
classes of the Church of Christ, using Kohlberg's test of moral devel­
opment and Goldman1s test of religious thinking. Brown and Annis 
(1978) also found a significant correlation (£=.44,£< .01) between 
subjects’ morality and literal scriptural belief in a study of 80 
undergraduates' responses to Rest's adaptation of Kohlberg's moral 
dilemma questionnaire.
Another study of 169 Protestant adults using Rest's Defining 
Issues Test found that seriousness of religious commitment, as meas­
ured by the degree of intrinsic religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 
1967) was clearly related to the extent to which adults made moral 
judgments reflecting the teachings of their congregations (Ernsberger 
& Manaster, 1981). These researchers also determined that "doctrinal 
differences apparently relate to strong differences in moral reason­
ing." For example, the Pearson £  between P score, the principled level 
of moral development in Rest's Defining Issues Test, and degree of 
religious orientation for United Methodist subjects was .33 ( e . < . 0 1 ) .  
However, for Unitarian-Universalist subjects no statistically sig­
nificant correlations were obtained. Ernsberger and Manaster con­
cluded "that both the degree of intrinsic religious orientation and
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the moral stages normative for one's religious community are predictors 
of moral development." In addition, they questioned "Kohlberg's con­
clusions that religious variables have little evident effect on moral 
development, at least with regard to adults."
Stevens, Blank, and Poushinsky (1977) studied 272 subjects ranging 
in age from 15 to 72 years with Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Test and 
Rest's Defining Issues Test. They determined that religious influences 
relate to moral reasoning but that the relationship depends upon the 
type of moral assessment used. This finding is of great importance in 
pinpointing a central issue in the study of moral development and reli­
gion.
Among 315 Jewish senior high school students, religious training 
and moral judgment were found to be positively related ( £ <  .01) (Sharf- 
man, 1974). Eisenberg-Berg and Roth (1980) used a moral judgment 
measure of their own and found the positive effects of religious 
training on the prosocial moral judgments of children. They decided 
that high religious participation was positively related (£(32)=.54, 
£^.001) to the use of needs-oriented reasoning and negatively related 
(£(32)=-.34, £ <  .05) to hedonistic reasoning.
Personality studies also have related religious behavior to 
moral traits. In a study of 102 undergraduates Sieracki and 
Mellinger (1980) found that the best predictor of a moral positivist 
was current church affiliation (£=.25, £ < . 0 1 )  combined with a con­
scientious personality (£=.43, £<.001). Wiebe and Fleck in their 
study of 158 college students (1980) found that intrinsically reli­
gious students tested on the 16PF test tended to be higher in
17
superego strength and emotional sensitivity than extrinsically and non­
religious subjects. The profiles of the latter two groups of students 
correlated at statistically significant levels (r(14)=.653, £^.01) and 
differed at a statistically significant level from the profiles of the 
intrinsically religious subjects (F(15,1740)=2.51, £<: .01). The 
researchers noted that the "intrinsically religious subjects tended to 
have a greater concern for moral standards, conscientiousness, disci­
pline, responsibility, and consistency than" did the other two groups. 
In addition, the intrinsically religious were more sensitive, empathe- 
tic, dependent, and open to their emotions. Nonreligious and extrinsi­
cally religious individuals showed more self-indulgence, indolence, and 
undependability.
The results of another study using the California Personality 
Inventory and the Defining Issues Test among 549 adolescents and young 
adult Catholic students (Polovy, 1980) indicated that those who pre­
ferred principled levels of moral reasoning were dependable (r=.32, 
£<.001), rational, creative (£=.44, £<.001), intelligent (£=.36, 
£.<.001), and accepting of rules and constraints of society (r=.26,
£ <  .001), but at the same time, able to think independently and aware 
of the need for change (r= .25, £<.001)."
Toward the Formulation of the Present Study
The leading voices in the area of moral development, Kohlberg, 
Rest, and Turiel, have contended "that religion is not a necessary or 
highly important condition for the development of moral judgment and 
conduct" and that "formal religious education has no specifically 
important or unique role to play in moral development" (Kohlberg,
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1981). Because there is doubt about this position, this study was 
undertaken to try to determine whether additional evidence for the 
relationship between religion and moral development exists.
PROBLEM
As shown previously, there is controversy concerning the role of 
religious commitment and religious education in the development of 
moral reasoning. The choice of measures seems to be crucial, with 
less religious influence being reflected when Kohlberg's Moral Judg­
ment Interview is used and more religious impact evident when other 
instruments are employed.
A certain portion of the relevant literature provided evidence 
that despite Kohlberg's assertion, religion may very well be an 
important correlate of moral judgment. The purpose of the study then 
was to determine whether there was further evidence for the relation­
ship between religiousness and moral judgment.
2To make such an investigation a multitrait-multisource matrix 
(Campbell & Fiske, 1959) was proposed to examine the intercorrela­
tions of three traits, (a) religiousness, (b) social skills (Stephens, 
1978), and (c) moral judgment, as measured by three sources, (a) 
teacher ratings, (b) self ratings, and (c) peer ratings. Also proposed was
For more precise terminology the term multitrait-multisource 
matrix is used here rather than the more common term, multitrait- 
multimethod matrix. In this study the method for each trait was a 
rating scale which was identical for the three different sources, 
teacher, self, and peer. Campbell and Fiske (1959) referred to 
"methods" (within quotation marks) when discussing ratings from dif­
ferent sources in another matrix.
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a second comparison between religiousness and moral judgment as assessed 
by established tests .
The concept of social skills was introduced as a discriminant vari­
able to help assess the relationship between moral judgment and reli­
gion in the obtained results. If there were no clearcut pattern in the 
findings regarding religiousness and moral judgment, the addition of a 
construct which could be related to either variable could help to dis­
cern meaning from the data. The possibility existed that there might 
be an overall cognitive social ability which underlies moral judgment 
and religiousness. Even though social skills, religiousness, and moral 
judgment can be seen as distinct constructs by a researcher, teacher 
and students may view these characteristics in a different way, perhaps 
as overlapping or even as synonymous traits. Therefore, a social 
skills measure was included to see if the subjects perceived the three 
variables as separable or not. The inclusion of this third trait in 
the multitrait-multisource matrix, then, was primarily a methodological 
desideratum rather than a purely theoretical consideration. The addi­
tion of social skills was meant to help demonstrate discriminant 
validity within the matrix and to help clarify the relationship of 
primary interest, that between religiousness and moral judgment.
HYPOTHESES
I. It is hypothesized that there is a positive relationship, statis­
tically significant at the .05 levels between religiousness and moral 
judgment as measured in this study.
A. Specifically, within the multitrait-multisource matrix used, 
it is hypothesized that convergent validity but not discriminant 
validity will be demonstrated. That is, there should be relatively 
large correlations between ratings of the same trait, religiousness, 
and between ratings of moral judgment, based on the different rating 
sources, teacher, self, and peer. And yet correlations should also
be high between the different traits, religiousness and moral judgment, 
based on the same or different rating sources.
B. It is hypothesized that scores from the Religious Belief 
Questionnaire (Apfeldorf, 1975) correlate positively, at the.05 level 
of statistical significance, with scores on the Defining Issues Test 




Pilot group. A pilot group of 67 eighth grade students was 
tested to determine the reliability of the rating scales used. The 
students consisted of 33 males and 34 females from above-average- 
level reading and honors-level math classes in a public junior high 
school in a small city, Slidell, Louisiana. In the pilot group 66 
of the subjects were white, and one was black.
Sample group. The sample consisted of 34 eighth grade students 
from a Louisiana History class in a public junior high school in 
Pearl River, Louisiana. Pearl River is a community with a population 
of less than 5,000 and is located in the rural southeastern part of 
the state, an area known for its religious and political conservatism. 
The socioeconomic status is at the middle to lower level. The sample 
consisted of 18 males and 16 females, 27 Protestants and 7 Catholics,
33 white students and one black. The students ranged in age from 12 to 
16 years with a mean age of 13.5 years. Within the group two students 
were 12 years of age, twenty-one were 13, four were 14, three were 15, 
two were 16, and two ages were not given. The subjects reported that 
they had known their fellow classmates an average of 4.75 years.
An attempt was made to test students in a larger, more cosmopoli­
tan junior high school. But since there were so many (16) sections of 
the grade level and since the classes changed hourly, the students in
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the larger school lacked sufficient familiarity with each other to 
perform the rating tasks in this study.
Measures
The five tests used were the (a) Religiousness Rating Scale, (b) 
Social Skills Rating Scale, (c) Moral Judgment Rating Scale, (d) 
Religious Belief Questionnaire, and (e) Defining Issues Test. Each 
test is described in the following sections.
Measure ]L - Religiousness Rating Scale - Appendix II.
As shown in Appendix II, the Religiousness Rating Scale consists 
of seven items of religious behavior on which students were rated by 
their teacher, peers, and themselves. A five-point Likert scale was 
used to rate religious activities according to frequency of occurrence. 
The seven items were based on similar items in Apfeldorf's (1975) 
Religious Behavior Questionnaire which concerns "membership in and 
interaction with a religious congregation, prayers, Bible reading, 
and relationships with one's fellow man" (Apfeldorf, 1975).
Cronbach's coefficient alpha (1951) was computed in determining 
the reliability of teacher and self ratings. Coefficient alpha is the 
mean of all split-half coefficients resulting from different splittings 
of a test. "Alpha estimates and is a lower bound to the proportion of 
test variance attributable to common factors among the items" (Cron- 
bach, 1951; Novick & Lewis, 1967). Coefficient alpha is used as a 
measure of internal consistency of the rating scales. A high alpha is 
to be desired.
The reliability coefficients of the pilot group ratings are pre­
sented in Table 1. The obtained values are at high levels and reflect
24
TABLE 1
RELIABILITY OF RATING SCALES-COEFFICIENT 























high internal consistency of the measures. The alpha coefficient for 
self ratings of religiousness was .86 in the pilot group (n=58).
Because the two teachers in the pilot group thought that they had too 
little knowledge of the religious practices of their students, too 
few cases were available for calculation of coefficient alpha. It was 
impracticable to compute Cronbach's alpha for peer ratings.
Measure 2_ - Social Skills Rating Scale - Appendix III.
A behavioral measure of social skills was administered to the sub­
jects. The scale was rated according to the five-point scale which 
was also used for the religiousness ratings. The chosen items were 
drawn from Factors 1 and 2, Academic Responsibility and Social Respon­
sibility (Stumme, Gresham, & Scott, 1983) of the Social Behavioral 
Assessment (Stephens, 1978). The sixteen rated items presented in 
Appendix III were derived from the four highest categories with the 
greatest factor loadings on Factors 1 and 2, which themselves account 
for almost 38% of the variance in teacher ratings of students' social 
skills.
The items concern classroom discussion, asking and answering 
questions, greeting others, positive attitude toward self, movement 
around environment, on-task behavior, acceptance of authority, and 
independent work. These skills comprise those behaviors highly valued 
by teachers and are more associated with classroom order and control, 
or social conformity, than with interpersonal interaction.
This scale measures that behavior most apparent to a student's 
teacher and peers, social conformity at school. The rated moral 
judgment and religiousness of a given student might or might not be
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related to his/her classroom social conformity, depending on the 
teacher and peers’ perception and knowledge of the student, the 
raters' tendency toward a response set, and the degree of interrela­
tionship of the three traits.
Alpha coefficients for pilot-group teacher and self-ratings of 
social skills are to be found in Table 1. Coefficient alpha for 
teacher ratings of social skills was .92 in the pilot group (n=66).
For self ratings of social skills coefficient alpha was .88 in the
pilot group (n=54). These values indicate high internal consistency of
social skills ratings by teacher and self.
Measure 3_ - Moral Judgment Rating Scale - Appendix IV.
The eight-item moral judgment rating measure used in the study is 
found in Appendix IV. Its form and directions are similar to those of 
the other two rating scales. An effort was made to include items per­
taining to moral judgment, not simply moral behavior, in keeping with 
the focus of the study, with the structural-developmental approach, 
and with the standardized moral judgment measure, Rest's Defining 
Issues Test.
The reliability coefficients for teacher and self ratings of moral 
judgment shown in Table 1 again reflect high internal consistency. 
Coefficient alpha for teacher ratings of moral judgment was .91 in the
pilot group (n=67). For self ratings of moral judgment coefficient
alpha was .86 in the pilot group (n=62).
Measure 4 - Religious Belief Questionnaire - Appendix V.
Form A of the Religious Belief Questionnaire and its scoring key 
are presented in Appendix V. The 64-item questionnaire was designed
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(Apfeldorf, 1975) to tap religious beliefs and attitudes within the 
following categories: God's existence and control of the universe,
prayer, the Bible, good and evil consequences, organized religion, 
religious practices, and duties of daily living. The Religious 
Belief Questionnaire "was constructed as a multi-denominational reli­
gious belief questionnaire designed to be relevant to all individuals 
in the Judaeo-Christian tradition" (Johnson & Bommarito, 1971). The 
test samples an individual's own personal beliefs, not necessarily 
the body of doctrine he or she has been taught in church, home, or 
school.
Split-half, odd-even reliability of the Religious Belief Ques­
tionnaire has been measured as .95 for Form A. The test correlated 
.69 with the Religious Scale of the Study of Values (Waldrop version). 
For fifty-four high school boys these two instruments correlated .72. 
For sixty-eight girls the two tests correlated .53. The Religious 
Belief Questionnaire also correlated .62 with Apfeldorf's Religious 
Behavior Questionnaire and .48 with the Religious Behavior Checklist 
among fifty-three Veterans Administration patients. RBQ scores, 
which can range from 64 to 320, were correlated with moral judgment 
scores on the following measure.
Measure 5_ - Defining Issues Test (PIT) - Appendix V I .
Because of its multiple-choice design, its objective scoring, its 
quick and easy group administration, its correlation in the .60's and 
.70's with Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and its wide use in 
research in the past few years, Rest's (1979b) Defining Issues Test 
was given to the subjects to measure moral judgment. The short form
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of this test, as shown in Appendix VI, has one sample item and three 
test dilemmas. Subjects are asked first to rate the importance of 
twelve considerations for each moral dilemma story and then to rank 
the four most important considerations for each dilemma.
Though the dilemmas are drawn from Kohlberg's Moral Judgment 
Interview and the dissertation of another moral researcher, Alan 
Lockwood, Rest asserts that the DIT is more than simply an objective 
test version of Kohlberg's instrument. Rest reports that he has taken 
the same theoretical approach as Kohlberg but used a different data 
source, a different method of data categorization, and different ways 
of indexing moral development. For example, in Kohlberg's interview 
a subject must spontaneously generate a solution to a problem, but in 
the DIT a subject need only evaluate considerations that are provided 
him. Since a recognition task is easier than a production task, sub­
jects are more advanced on the DIT. A  second difference is that a 
scoring judge is required in Kohlberg's procedure, whereas the sub­
ject's responses are scored objectively in the DIT. A third distinc­
tion is that Kohlberg's assessment can place a subject within a stage 
type, whereas the DIT P index gives an overall score, more like 
Kohlberg's Moral Maturity Score. There are also some differences be­
tween the two systems in definitions of stage characteristics (Rest, 
1979b).
When hand-scored in the objective manner described in Rest's 
(1979b) manual, the Defining Issues Test yields a P% score or percent- 
of-principled-morality score which can range from 0 to 95. It is 
reported that for the full six-story DIT "test-retest stability over
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several weeks averages .81 in a number of samples; internal consis­
tency averages .78" (Rest, 1979). Test-retest correlations for P scores 
in the short-form DIT have been reported as .77, .67, and .65 for high 
school through adult samples and .58 for a group of 19 ninth graders.
On the short form coefficient alpha for the P index has been found to 
be .76.
The three stories in the short form (Heinz, Prisoner, Newspaper) 
were selected by Rest because they had the highest correlation (.91 
for P score) of any three-story set with the complete six-story set.
Rest (1979b) has concluded "that the shorter version has substantially 
the same properties as the six-story form."
The test's author notes (1979) that the DIT has special features 
to safeguard against the three most serious threats to its internal 
and external validity. A "Consistency check" identifies tests that 
are answered in a random or meaningless pattern. A number of "M" 
items - impressive, sophisticated-sounding statements which are lacking 
in meaning - are included to determine whether subjects are choosing 
items for their apparent complexity rather than their actual meaning.
And several studies have concluded that though subjects can fake low, 
they cannot fake high without invalidating their tests.
Rest admits that "geographical region of country and religious 
affiliation have a significant relation to the DIT. Religion can have 
either a retarding effect or facilitating effect, depending on how 
dogmatic or humanistic its stance is on ethical issues." He has re­
ported (1979b) that "samples with the lowest P7o scores in each edu­
cation grouping show a disproportionate representation from the
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Southern IKS., an area of the country usually noted for a conservative 
and traditional outlook . . . and a conservative intellectual milieu."
Measure 6_ - Religious Data Survey - Appendix VII.
Certain demographic religious information was gathered from the 
subjects using the form found in Appendix VII.
Procedure
Pilot group. The 67 subjects in the pilot group were adminis­
tered the Religiousness Rating Scale, Social Skills Rating Scale, and 
Moral Judgment Rating Scale to assess the reliability of the measures. 
The tests were given to the group of students in a randomized order 
over a period of three days. Students rated their peers and them­
selves from 1 to 5 for increasing frequency of behavior on various 
items. They were asked to avoid the 0 or "Don't know" response when­
ever possible. The two teachers in the pilot group were also asked to 
complete the three rating scales, giving their opinions of all the 
students in their classes.
Sample Group. The 34 subjects in the sample were administered 
the three rating scales, the Defining Issues Test, the Religious 
Belief Questionnaire, and the Religious Data Survey over a period of 
five days. Except for the brief Religious Data Survey, each test took 
from twenty to fifty minutes to complete. Testing took place over 
several days to avoid tiring the subjects as well as to ensure the same 
subject pool within the changing classes of a junior high school. The 
RBQ and the DIT were given on the first two days of testing, while the 
order of the three rating scales was randomized, providing a mix of the 
three scales on the last three assessment days. The teacher of the
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class was asked to rate her students with the Religiousness, Social 
Skills, and Moral Judgment Rating Scales.
Statistical Analysis
Coefficient alpha and a partial correlation were computed for the 
rating scales using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, &Bent, 1979). The Statis­
tical Analysis System (SAS) (1982) was used to compute descriptive 
statistics for the variables, Pearson product moment correlation co­
efficients among all the test scores, scatter diagrams for the corre­
lation coefficients, and a canonical correlation analysis (Hotelling, 
1935, 1936). Intercorrelations for the three rating scales as com­
pleted by teacher, self, and peer were analyzed in a multitrait- 
multisource matrix (Campbell & Fiske, 1959).
RESULTS
Presentation will first be made of the alpha coefficients 
obtained for the rating scales used in the sample group. Examination 
of the major findings of the study in relation to the hypotheses will 
then follow. Finally, other results will be provided including (a) 
findings concerning the social skills variable, (b) results from a 
partial correlation, (c) descriptive statistics for the test scores, 
with particular attention given to the Defining Issues Test, (d) an 
investigation of peer ratings as affected by gender, and (e) a 
canonical correlation analysis.
Alpha Coefficients for Rating Seales in Sample Group
The alpha coefficients for teacher and self ratings of reli­
giousness, social skills, and moral judgment in the sample group are 
presented in Table 2. Coefficient alpha for self ratings of reli­
giousness was .90 in the sample group (n=28). The teacher in the 
sample group gave complete religiousness ratings for only three sub­
jects, and coefficient alpha for these three cases was .45. For 
social skills coefficient alpha was .95 (n=30) for teacher ratings 
and .93 (n=26) for self ratings. For teacher ratings of moral judg­
ment coefficient alpha was .97 (n=30). Alpha coefficient for self 
ratings of moral judgment was .85 (n=29).
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a striking similarity in the levels of the reliability values obtained 
from both groups tested, the pilot group and the sample group. It 
might be added that the small differences in the alpha coefficients 
that do exist between the sample and the pilot groups are almost all 
in the favor of the sample group.
Correlation Coefficients
Person product moment correlation coefficients were determined 
among all the variables in the study. Scatter diagrams were plotted 
and inspected for all the correlated scores. Many of the correlation 
coefficients found are presented in Table 3. As each hypothesis is 
discussed in the following sections, smaller tables derived from Table 
3 will be presented to provide the necessary results without extraneous 
data.
Hypothesis 1̂
The major hypothesis of the study, that there would be a positive 
relationship, statistically significant at the .05 level, between 
religiousness and moral judgment, was found to be supported when indi­
vidual students are rated regarding these characteristics by their 
teacher and classmates. The pertinent correlation coefficients are 
presented in Table 4. In this table it can be seen that religious­
ness and moral judgment correlate .66 ( £ < . 0001) when rated by 
teacher, .80 (£<.0001) when rated by All Peers, .65 (£<.0001) when 
rated by Same Sex Peers, and .61 (£ <.0001) when rated by Opposite 
Sex Peers. Teacher ratings of moral judgment correlated .77 
(£<.0001) with All Peer ratings of religiousness, .67 (£<.0001) 
with Same Sex Peer ratings of religiousness, and .63 (£<.0002) with
TABLE 3
CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS
Teacher Teacher Teacher Self Self Self All Peer All Peer All Peer









Self .02 .17 -.20
Relig.
Self .33 .30 .20 .27
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Self .24 .33 .24 .21 .81d
Moral
All Peer .64d .78d ,77d .18 .44a .44a
Relig.
All Peer .51b ,81d .87d -.05 .31 .40a .83d
Social
All Peer .61c .79d .87d -.03 .33 .35# .80d .94d
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.46b .69d ,67d .35# .45a .41a • 87d .71d .66d
S.S. Peer 
Social
.46b .83d . 77d .12 ,36a .40® .82d . 94d .88d
S.S. Peer 
Moral
.56° • 73d .79d -.01 .24 .29 .75d .87d .92d
O.S. Peer 
Relig.
.69d .52b .63c -.24 .28 .29 . 71d .65d .64d
O.S. Peer 
Social
.52b .67d .87d .26 .24 .35a .73d .92d ,88d
O.S. Peer 
Moral
.58° • 57c .81d -.09 .38a .35* ,66d .81d .86d
Relig. B. 
Question.
.23 .10 .01 .36a .18 .11 .21 .15 .15
Defining 
Issues T.
.22 .06 .07 .49b .02 .17 .13 -.03 -.01
# - £  = .05 
a - £  4 -05
b - £  < .01 
c - £  < .001 
d - £  < .0001
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£  ^  . 0 0 0 1
.29 -.11
Self -.20 -.03 - . 0 1 -.09 . 2 1 .49
£ < . 0 1 2 0
RBQ . 0 1 .15 .24 - . 0 1 .11 .09
38
Opposite Sex Peer ratings of religiousness. Teacher ratings of reli­
giousness correlated .61 (£<.0002) with All Peer ratings of moral 
judgment, .56 (£<.0010) with Same Sex Peer ratings of moral judgment, 
and .58 (£<.0006) with Opposite Sex Peer ratings of moral judgment.
In addition, All Peer ratings of religiousness correlated .75 
(£ <.0001) with Same Sex Peer ratings of moral judgment and .66 
(£<.0001) with Opposite Sex Peer ratings of moral judgment. All 
Peer ratings of moral judgment correlated .66 (£<.0001) with Same Sex 
Peer ratings of religiousness and .64 (£<.0001) with Opposite Sex 
Peer ratings of religiousness. Also, Same Sex Peer ratings of moral 
judgment correlated .55 (£<.0007) with Opposite Sex Peer ratings of 
religiousness, and Same Sex Peer ratings of religiousness correlated 
.52 (£<.0017) with Opposite Sex Peer ratings of moral judgment.
Though there are fewer statistically significant correlations 
involving self ratings, it can be observed that self rating of moral 
judgment correlated significantly with peer ratings of religiousness 
(r=.44, £<.012, All Peer); (r= .41, £<.0198, Same Sex Peer). Also, 
self ratings of religiousness correlated significantly (r=.49, £<.0120) 
with the DIT moral judgment measure.
The statistically nonsignificant correlations that were obtained 
occurred in some instances when the individual rated himself or 
responded to the self-endorsed DIT or RBQ. For example, self ratings 
of moral judgment correlated .24 with teacher ratings of religiousness, 
.29 with opposite sex peer ratings of religiousness, and .21 with self 
ratings of religiousness. Self ratings of religiousness correlated 
-.20 with teacher ratings of moral judgment, -.03 with all peer ratings
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of moral judgment, -.01 with same sex peer ratings of moral judgment, 
-.09 with opposite sex peer ratings of moral judgment, and .21 with 
self ratings of moral judgment. Scores on The Defining Issues Test, 
which students answered individually, correlated with religiousness 
measures in the following ways: .22 with teacher ratings, .13 with
all peer ratings, .27 with same sex peer ratings, and -.11 with
opposite sex peer ratings. Scores on The Religious Belief Question­
naire, the self-endorsed religious test, correlated with moral judg­
ment measures as follows: .01 with teacher ratings, .15 with all peer
ratings, .24 with same sex peer ratings, -.01 with opposite sex peer
ratings, .11 with self ratings, and .09 with scores on the DIT.
Because there are statistically significant correlations between 
religiousness and moral judgment among all of the external respondents 
who rated each student, there is evidence to confirm Hypothesis I in 
one sense. That is, there is found to be a statistically significant 
relationship between religiousness and moral judgment, especially 
when individuals are rated regarding these characteristics by other 
people.
Hypothesis !I. A. - Multitrait-Multisource Matrix
When the corrrelation coefficients are placed into the multitrait- 
multisource matrix as planned in section A. of Hypothesis I, the 
results are quite similar. The matrix using All Peer ratings is pre­
sented in Table 5. The matrices with Same Sex and Opposite Sex Peer 
rating data follow in Tables 6 and 7 respectively. The latter tables 
are provided in the interests of complete presentation of obtained 
results. Because Tables 6 and 7 differ from Table 5 only in the peer
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TABLE 5
MULTITRAIT - MULTISOURCE MATRIX
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TABLE 5A
MULTITRAIT - MULTISOURCE MATRIX INCLUDING ALL PEER 
RATINGS WITH SELF RATINGS EXTRACTED
SOURCES 1. Teacher 2. All Peer
Ratings Ratings




2. All Peer d d dRatings R .64 00 .77
SS • 51b ■ 81d 00 .83d
c d d d dMJ .61 'vl VO .87 .80 .94
a - p ^.05 Validity diagonal - underlined values,
b - .01
c - p <£ .001 
d - .0001
R - Religiousness
SS - Social Skills
MJ - Moral Judgment
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TABLE 6
MULTITRAIT - MULTISOURCE MATRIX
WITH SAME SEX PEER RATINGS
SOURCES 1. Teacher 2. Self 3. S.S.Peer
Ratings Ratings Ratings








Ratings R .02 .17 -.20
SS .33 .30 .20 .27
MJ .24 .33 .24 .21 .81d
3. S.S. Peer
Ratings R .46b .69 .67 ■ 35a .45 .41
SS .46b .83d .77d .12 a.36 .40a .76d
MJ .56° .75d _j_79d -.01 .24 .29 •65d .89d
a - £ < . 0 5  Validity diagonals - underlined values,
b - p <.01 
c - p" < *001 
d - £ <  .0001
R - Religiousness
SS - Social Skills
MJ - Moral Judgment
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TABLE 6A 
MULTITRAIT - MULTISOURCE MATRIX 
INCLUDING SAME SEX PEER RATINGS WITH 
SELF RATINGS EXTRACTED
SOURCES 1 . Teacher Lu­ S.S. Peer
Ratines Ratines








Ratines R .46b ,69d .67
SS .46b ■ 83d .77d .76d
MJ .56° .75d .79d .65d • 89d
a - p <.05 Validity diagonal - underlined values,
b - p <.01 
c - p < . 001 
d - p <.0001
R - Religiousness
SS - Social Skills
MJ - Moral Judgment
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TABLE 7
MULTITRAIT - MULTISOURCE MATRIX
WITH OPPOSITE SEX PEER RATINGS
SOURCES 1. Teacher 2. Self 3. O.S. Peer
Ratings Ratings Ratines








Ratines R .02 .17 -.20
SS .33 .30 .20 .27
MJ .24 .33 .24 .21 .81d
3. O.S. Peer bRatines R .69 .52 .63 -.24 .28 .29
SS .52b • 67d .87d -.26 ^ .35a d.70
MJ .58° .57c .81d -.09 .38a .35a d d .61 .87
a - p ^.05 Validity diagonals - underlined values
b - "p < .01 
c - "p < .001 
d - p" <.0001
R - Religiousness
SS - Social Skills
MJ - Moral Judgment
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TABLE 7A 
MULTITRAIT - MULTISOURCE MATRIX 
INCLUDING OPPOSITE SEX PEER RATINGS WITH 
SELF RATINGS EXTRACTED
SOURCES 1 . Teacher 2 . O.S. Peer
Ratines Ratines







2. O.S. Peer 
Ratines R .69d .52b .63°
SS .52b ^ z d .87d . 70d
MJ .58C .57c .81d .61d
d.87
a - p < , 0 5  Validity diagonal - underlined values,
b - p <.01 
c - "p" < . 001 
d - "p”< .0001
R - Religiousness
SS - Social Skills
MJ - Moral Judgment
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correlations and because the same-sex and opposite-sex correlations 
are derived from the all peer correlations, Tables 5 and 5A will be 
the chief points of reference for the following discussion.
For convergent validity to be demonstrated in the matrix the des­
ignated values in . . the validity diagonals should be significantly 
different from zero and sufficiently large to encourage further exami­
nation of validity" (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). That is, there should 
be relatively large correlations between measures of the same trait 
across the different rating sources, teacher, self, and peer. Thus, 
it was expected that correlations among the three measures of reli­
giousness would be relatively large. However, this requirement was 
satisfied only with teacher and peer ratings of religiousness 
(£=.64, £<.0001). Self ratings of religiousness, whether correlated 
with teacher ratings (£=.02) or peer ratings (£=.18) yielded extremely 
low and statistically nonsignificant correlations. A similar pattern 
emerged with correlations between ratings of moral judgment. Teacher 
and peer ratings of moral judgment resulted in a highly significant 
correlation of .87 (£<.001), and yet self ratings, again, showed low 
and statistically nonsignificant correlations with teacher ratings 
(£=.24) and with peer ratings (£=.35) of moral judgment. Similar 
findings occurred when correlations between ratings of social skills 
were examined. Teacher and peer ratings of social skills correlated 
with statistical significance (£=.81, £-^.0001). Yet self ratings, 
when correlated with teacher ratings (£=.30) and with peer ratings 
(£=.31) resulted in low and statistically nonsignificant values.
Only three of the nine correlations in the validity diagonals
47
of the multitrait-multisource matrix meet the specified requirement of 
being significantly different from zero and sufficiently large to 
encourage further examination of validity. Therefore, it cannot be 
claimed that convergent validity in the matrix has been established. 
When, however, self ratings are extracted from the matrix, as shown in 
the reduced matrix in Table 5A (as well as in Tables 6A and 7A) con­
vergent validity is demonstrated.
A second part of Hypothesis I.A. stated that discriminant valid­
ity would not be evident in the multitrait-multisource matrix. That 
is, if religiousness and moral judgment are related in a positive and 
statistically significant fashion, then correlations between them 
should be high whether judged by the same source or by different 
sources, either teacher, self, or peers.
Discriminant validity is determined by three criteria (Campbell & 
Fiske, 1959). The first is that a value in a validity diagnonal 
should be larger than the values lying in its column and row in the 
heterotrait-heterosource triangles, or those enclosed by a broken 
line in Table 5. Since such is not generally the case with the values 
in the matrix, one requirement for discriminant validity has not been 
met. It will be remembered from the statement of Hypothesis I.A. that 
to show a relationship between the variables of religiousness and 
moral judgment, discriminant validity should not be found. That is, 
correlations should be high between the different traits, religious­
ness and moral judgment, based on the same or different rating sources.
A second requirement for discriminant validity ". . . i s  that a 
variable correlate higher with an independent effort to measure the
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same trait than with measures designed to get at different traits 
which happen to employ the same method. For a given variable, this 
involves comparing its values in the validity diagonals with its values 
in the heterotrait-monomethod triangles" enclosed by a solid line in 
Table 5 (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). Again the data in the matrix do not 
fulfill this condition.
A third condition contributing to discriminant validity is that 
each triangle in the matrix exhibit a like pattern of trait interrela­
tionship. This provision has been met to some degree, with social 
skills and moral judgment the highest correlation in 6 of the 9 tri­
angles and the other two correlations within each triangle at a lower 
level but close in value to one another. So evidence for the third 
condition for discriminant validity is equivocal.
The overall finding is that correlations are, in fact, generally 
high between the different traits, religiousness and moral judgment. 
Since correlations tend to be reduced in a homogeneous group of sub­
jects, such as the students used in this study, one could expect 
larger correlations in a nonhomogeneous group.
Because some degree of convergent validity has been found and much 
evidence for discriminant validity is lacking within the multitrait- 
multisource matrix, Part A of Hypothesis I can be confirmed to some 
extent. That there is a positive and significant relationship 
between religiousness and moral judgment is undeniable, but the 
relationship must be qualified, especially when the individual himself 
is a respondent.
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Hypothesis I_. B. - DIT & RBQ
Part B. of Hypothesis I, that scores from the Religious Belief 
Questionnaire (RBQ) would correlate significantly with scores on the 
Defining Issues Test (DIT) of moral judgment, fails to gain support in 
the data. It was expected that the relationship between religiousness 
and moral judgment would be evident not only in intercorrelations of 
the multitrait-multisource matrix, but also between two established, 
standardized tests of religious belief and moral reason. However, the 
correlation between scores on the two tests, the RBQ and the DIT, was 
a low r=.09. And yet the DIT moral judgment measure correlated .49 
with the self rating of religiousness (SRR), statistically significant 
at the .01 level. The two self-endorsed religious measures, the RBQ 
and the SRR, themselves correlated .36 (£< .05). Though some of the 
items in both tests are similar - for example: SRR 1. Goes to church
and RBQ 52. I_ believe in keeping the Sabbath; SRR 4. Prays and RBQ 
24. I_ can talk to God in prayer and He hears m e ; SRR 7. Reads the 
Bible and RBQ 30. £  believe that the Bible is the word of G o d . - the 
items express either a behavior or action in the SRR versus a belief 
or principle in the RBQ. Of course, belief and action are not always 
consistent.
It is the more behavioral measure of religiousness, the SRR, 
which produced a statistically significant correlation (r=.49, E^.Ol) 
with the DIT. Self ratings of religiousness tended toward the posi­
tive pole, as did responses on the RBQ. The mean for SRR (3.20, 
£=1.06, n=30) is statistically higher (£<.01) than the means of 
teacher ratings of religiousness (2.61, £=.95, nf=32) and all peer
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ratings of religiousness (2.16, _s=.51, n_=34). On the RBQ the mean score 
obtained was 276.97 (s.=40.9), which converted to a percentage score of 
83.2.
A factor which may account for the RBQ's low correlation with the 
DIT is the restricted range of scores on the RBQ, as shown in Table 8, 
and on the DIT. One can observe in Table 8 that 26 of the 32 RBQ 
scores were distributed in the upper quarter and that only two scores 
fell below the mid-point of the scale. On the DIT 15 of the P% scores 
were distributed in the lower quarter; eleven were found in the second 
quarter; two were placed in the third quarter; and none were appor­
tioned to the upper quarter. It appears that many of the scores on 
the RBQ clustered near the high end of the scale and that many of the 
P% indices on the DIT fell near the low end of its scale. If the range 
of scores were greater, the obtained correlation would likely be higher. 
On the SRR scores ranged the full bandwidth from a minimum of 1 to a 
maximum of 5.
Since each hypothesis has been considered in relation to the 
results, attention can now be turned to the remainder of the results 
obtained in this study. As stated previously, the findings relevant to 
the social skills variable will be presented next, followed by results 
from a partial correlation. A presentation of descriptive statistics 
for test scores will follow, focusing particularly on the DIT. A 
fourth part will provide data on the gender differences found in the 
peer ratings, and a brief section will follow on the canonical correla­
tion analysis.
TABLE 8
RELIGIOUS BELIEF QUESTIONNAIRE 
DISTRIBUTION AND PERCENTAGES OF SCORES
Score % N Score % N
314 97.7 1 286 86.7 1
313 97.3 1 285 86.3 1
311 96.5 1 283 85.5 1
310 96.1 1 282 85.2 1
309 95.7 1 275 82.4 1
308 95.3 1 269 80.1 1
307 94.9 2 257 75.4 1
306 94.5 1 256 75.0 1
305 94.1 1 251 73.0 1
296 90.6 2 246 71,1 1
295 90.2 1 206 55.5 1
294 89.8 3 195 51.2 1
291 88.7 1 188 48.4 1
287 87.1 1 147 32.4 1
Note: N=32




Although the concept of social skills was included to help clarify 
the relationship between religiousness and moral judgment, results 
from the multitrait-multisource matrix in Table 5 show that social 
skills related to religion and even more so to moral judgment in much 
the same way that religiousness and moral judgment related to each 
other. Social skills and religiousness and social skills and moral 
judgment showed a positive relationship at statistically significant 
levels when rated by teacher and peers, and even in some cases, the 
individual student. These findings will be discussed further in rela­
tion to method variance, response set, and interrelationship of the 
three traits.
Partial Correlation
Partial correlations were computed to show the relationship be­
tween religiousness and moral judgment while adjusting for the effects 
of the social skill variable. The partial correlation is based on the 
assumption of linear relationships among the variables. By making 
statistical predictions of religiousness and moral judgment from the 
knowledge of the effect that social skills has on the two variables 
and then finding the difference between the original and the predicted 
values, one derives new variables which are uncorrelated with the 
social skills control variable. The linear effect of the control vari­
able, social skills, is removed from the religiousness and moral judg­
ment variables, and the correlation between their adjusted values is 
the partial correlation (Nie et al., 1979).
Whereas the original correlation for teacher ratings of
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religiousness and moral judgment was .66 (2. <.0001), the partial corre­
lation was .33 (£<.035, n=28). For self ratings of religiousness and 
moral judgment the correlation was .21; the partial correlation was -.03 
(2.= .446, n=25). All peer ratings of religiousness and moral judgment 
correlated .80 (£<.0001); after the effect of social skills was con­
trolled, the correlation was .11 (£=.277, n=31). The correlation for 
same sex peer ratings of religiousness and moral judgment was .65 
(£<.0001); the partial correlation was -.08 (£=.329, n=31) . Opposite 
sex peer ratings of religiousness and moral judgment correlated .61 
(£<.0001); the partial correlation was -.001 (£=.498, n=31).
Descriptive Statistics for Test Scores
The descriptive statistics for the test scores in the study are 
presented in Table 9. A more detailed examination of results from the 
DIT will now be made.
Regarding the moral judgment test, the Defining Issues Test, it 
can be seen from Table 9 that the P7„ or percentage of principled level 
moral choices made by the students ranged from 3.3 to 40.0 with a mean 
P70 score of 19.3. For each subject the P70 score is found by adding 
raw scores from moral stages 5A, 5B, and 6, the principled moral 
stage levels, and dividing by .3 (3 being the number of stories in the 
short form DIT).
Since the P7o score ignores moral levels below Stage 5, it can be 
useful to have an indication of scores in the lower stages. For this 
purpose Rest (1979b) recommends a group stage profile. Such a profile 
for the sample in this study is presented in Figure 1. The subjects 
had a group mean score of 23.3 in Stage 2, 27.3 in Stage 3, 34.4 in
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TABLE 9
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR TEST SCORES
Group Test N Mean S.D. Min. Max. S.E.
Teacher Relig. 32 2.61 .96 1.00 4.42 .17
Teacher Social 34 3.76 .77 1.87 4.93 .13
Teacher Moral 31 3.77 .79 2.00 5.00 .14
Self Relig. 30 3.20 1.06 1.00 5.00 .19
Self Social 30 3.59 .98 1.62 5.00 .18
Self Moral 32 3.93 .77 2.00 5.00 .14
All Peer Relig. 34 2.16 .51 1.23 3.03 .09
All Peer Social 34 3.04 .47 2.19 3.98 .08
All Peer Moral 34 3.34 .56 2.40 4.35 .10
S.S. Peer Relig. 34 2.41 .73 1.26 3.75 .13
S.S. Peer Social 34 3.07 .52 2.16 4.03 .09
S .S . Peer Moral 34 3.39 .64 2.36 4.33 .11
O.S. Peer Relig. 34 2.07 .47 1.09 2.98 .08
O.S. Peer Social 34 3.03 .47 2.06 4.04 .08
O.S. Peer Moral 34 3.32 .56 2.38 4.38 .10
Self RBQ 32 276.97 40.90 147.00 314.00 7.23
Self DIT 33 19.29 10.32 3.30 40.00 1.95
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S t a g e  2 3 4 5A 5B 6 F$
Means 23.33 2 ? . 3 1  3 ^ 1  1 5 . 5 6  8 . 4 7  5*30  1 9 . 2 9
FIGURE I
DIT STAGE SCORE USAGE - GROUP STAGE PROFILE
Note; The mean P% score of 19.29 was determined from scores on Stages 
5A, 5B, and 6, the stages of principled moral reasoning.
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Stage 4, 15.6 in Stage 5A, 8.5 in Stage 5B, 5.3 in Stage 6, 7.8 of A 
items which typify an "anti-establishment" orientation, and 7.94 for M 
items.
The mean P% of 19.3 for eighth graders is comparable to other 
results reported by Rest (1979b) . The average P% scores for eighth 
graders as reported in several different studies are given below in 
Table 10.
TABLE 10
DIT AVERAGE P% SCORES OF EIGHTH GRADERS
p% N P% N
16.1 12 21.3 12
17.0 21 21.9 1322
18.8 24 22.0 17
20.6 12 22.7 17
Though 33 students in this study completed the DIT, five of the 
tests were invalidated because of inconsistencies (n=3) or excessive 
choices of "M" items (n=2). "M" items are those lofty but nonsensi­
cal statements included in the test to distinguish authentic high 
level moral reasoning from endorsement of seemingly complex but 
meaningless items. Rest notes that one typically loses 5-157a of the 
sample due to the reliability checks in the DIT. The loss of five in 
this study is within the typical range, though at the high end. The 
reasons for this are probably because of the subjects' age, which is 
at the lower limit for the DIT, and possibly, also, because the sub­
jects included students of lower academic ability who might not have 
understood the test clearly.
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Gender Differences in Peer Ratings
As can be seen in Table 9, peer ratings were determined not only 
across all 34 classmates of both genders but also for same sex and 
opposite sex peers. Some research with peer ratings has shown a bias 
in favor of same sex peers over opposite sex peers, particularly at 
this age level (Hartup, 1970). In the present study the mean ratings 
given peers of the same sex were consistently higher (religiousness 
2.41, £=.73; social skills 3.07, £=.52; moral judgment 3.39, £=.64) 
than the means of all peer ratings (religiousness 2.16, £=.64; social 
skills 3.04, £=.47; moral judgment 3.34, £=.56), which were in turn 
slightly higher than the mean scores given peers of the opposite sex 
(religiousness 2.07, £=.47; social skills 3.03, £=.47; moral judgment 
3.32, £=.56). These results are presented in Table 11. These dif­
ferences were in the expected direction judging from previous 
investigations. The difference in religiousness scores between same 
sex and opposite sex peers was statistically significant (£=2.2880, df= 
66, £  < . 05) .
The sex differences by group were broken down into male-female 
mean ratings for same sex or opposite sex peers. These results are 
presented in Table 12. Girls gave other female students the highest 
mean ratings on religiousness (2.83, £=.68), social skills (3.32, 
£=.47), and moral judgment (3.64, £=.60), whereas boys gave other male 
students the lowest mean scores on religiousness (2.03, £=.57), social 
skills (2.84, £=.46), and moral judgment (3.17, £=.62). The differ­
ences between the means of girls' ratings of girls and boys' ratings of 
boys were statistically significant in every case: religiousness
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TABLE 11
PEER RATING MEAN SCORES - SEX DIFFERENCES BY GROUP
Rating
All Peer Same Sex Opposite Sex
Scale Mean S .D. Mean S.D. Mean S.D.
Religiousness 2.16 .51 2.41* .73 2.07* .47
Social Skills 3.04 .47 3.07 .52 3.03 .47
Moral Judgment 3.34 .56 3.39 .64 3.32 .56
* There was a statistically significant difference between 
the means of same sex peer rating of religiousness and 




PEER RATING MEAN SCORES - MALE-FEMALE SEX DIFFERENCES
Rating
Same Sex Opposite Sex
Scale M  by M F by F M by F F by M
Religiousness 2.03 £=.57 a2 .83 £=.68 d2 .08 £=.58 2.06 |cn II • u>
Social Skills 2.84 _s=.46 b3.32 £=.47 e2.97 £=.46 3.10 £=.49
Moral Judgment 3.17 s=.62 3.64 £=.60
f
3.25 £=.46 3.40 £= .66
Note: There were statistically significant differences between the
means of the following groups: 
a - p -*.01 Males by males and females by females, religiousness
b - p^-^.05 Males by males and females by females, social skills
c - p"<:.05 Males by males and females by females, moral judgment
d - "p < .01 Males by females and females by females, religion
e -pT<.05 Males by females and females by females, social 
f -"p<.05 Males by females and females by females, moral
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(£=3.658, df=32 „ E.<.01); social skills (£=2.047, df=32. £<.05); and 
moral judgment (£=2.253, df=32, £<.05).
A comparison of opposite sex ratings by each gender, however, 
showed no statistically significant differences. For example, on 
religiousness girls gave boys a mean rating of 2.08 (£=.58), while 
boys rated girls 2.06 (£=.33). On social skills girls' mean rating of 
boys was 2.97 (£=.46), and boys' mean rating of girls was 3.10 (£=.49). 
The difference again was statistically nonsignificant. On moral 
judgment girls gave boys a mean rating of 3.25 (£=.46), and boys gave 
girls a mean score of 3.40 (£=.66). This difference was also statis­
tically nonsignificant.
When the data from the same sex and opposite sex columns were 
regrouped for girls' ratings of both girls and boys and boys' ratings 
of both girls and boys, it became apparent that girls' ratings of 
other girls were higher than were their ratings of boys, and that the 
differences were statistically significant. On religiousness girls' 
rating of girls was 2.83 (£=.68) and girls' rating of boys was 2.08 
(£=.58): (£=3.437, df=32, £<.01). On social skills girls' rating of 
girls was 3.32 (£=.47), and girls' ratings of boys was 2.97 (£=.46): 
(£=2.245, df=32, £<.05). On moral judgment girls' rating of girls was 
3.64 (£=.60), and girls' ratings of boys was 3.25 (£=.46): (£=2.098, 
df=32 , £ <  .05).
Though boys also rated girls higher than they rated other boys on 
all three measures, the differences between boys' ratings were not 
statistically significant. On religiousness boys' rating of girls was 
2.06 (£=.33), while boys' ratings of boys was 2.03 (£=.57);
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(nonsignificant difference). On social skills boys rated girls 3.10 
(£=.49), and boys rated boys 2.84 (£=.46). This difference was also 
lacking in statistical significance. On moral judgment boys gave 
girls a mean score of 3.40 (£=.66), while they gave other boys a mean 
score of 3.17 (£=.62). Again, there was no statistically significant 
difference.
In Tables 11 and 12 it is apparent that boys and girls were alike 
in consistently rating religiousness lowest,social skills next highest, 
and moral judgment highest. It will be noted from the more-inclusive 
Table 9 that, without exception, all groupings of respondents 
including teacher and self showed this pattern. That is, within each 
subject group, there was a regular trend of increasing mean scores 
from religiousness to social skills to moral judgment.
Canonical Correlation Analysis
In addition to the Pearson r correlation coefficients that were 
performed among the variables in the study, a canonical correlation 
analysis was computed (Hotelling, 1935, 1936). The aim of canonical 
correlation analysis is to maximize the correlation between two sets 
of variables. One set of variables consisted of teacher and all peer 
ratings of religiousness, social skills, and moral judgment, while the 
other set consisted of scores on the Defining Issues Test of moral 
judgment and the Religious Belief Questionnaire. The procedure pro­
duced results that were non-significant for the two discriminant func­
tions (F=.87, £=.58; F=.74, £=.60).
DISCUSSION
In the introduction of this paper a problematic issue in the 
study of moral development was set forth: Does religion relate to
moral judgment? It was shown that the leading authority in the field 
of moral development, Lawrence Kohlberg, would probably answer that 
religion is not a necessary or highly important correlate of moral 
judgment. He and other researchers can marshal evidence in support 
of his position. But still other investigators disagree, just as 
some researchers have differed with other aspects of Kohlberg's 
theories, system, and method. These students of moral development 
can provide experimental results consistent with their conviction 
that religiousness and moral judgment relate in an important way.
So considerable controversy exists on this issue, and the matter 
awaits resolution.
The debate on the relationship between religiousness and moral 
judgment is primarily of theoretical importance, but it has practical 
implications as well. It has a bearing on child-rearing practices, 
education, and corrections and rehabilitation. By studying the topic 
of moral reasoning and religion one can gain an understanding of 
moral development and personality.
Therefore, the subject of religiousness and moral judgment 
seemed worthy of further investigation. The present study did not 
propose so ambitious a goal as to quell all argument on the matter but 
was intended as one of a series of studies which might eventually
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produce consequential findings. For example, it was an original aim 
of the study to compare religiousness and moral judgment in public, 
private, and parochial schools so as to better address the question of 
the role of religious education in the development of moral reason.
But first an examination had to be made of subjects within one school 
in order to test the more basic question of whether, in fact, reli­
giousness and moral judgment do relate. If, then, a relationship were 
found, it could be investigated further in different settings.
The major finding of this study is that religiousness and moral 
judgment, as rated by a student's peers and teacher, have been shown 
to relate in a positive way and at statistically significant levels. 
This finding holds true very strongly for teacher and classmates’ per­
ceptions of individuals in this study, and the relationship is shown 
in some cases for an individual's own self evaluation. Since the 
results were obtained for eighth grade students, one might expect even 
more correlation between religiousness and moral judgment if older 
students and adults were tested. Because of the stage of intellectual 
development typical at age 13, a youth of this age is not usually cap­
able of generalizing to a great degree and tends to be more specific 
in terms of behaviors, beliefs, and judgments. With increasing age and 
capacity for generalization, then, the obtained correlations should be 
even more pronounced.
In this study the teacher's own appraisals of religiousness and 
moral judgment showed high and statistically significant agreement, as 
did peers' estimations of a classmate's religiousness and moral judg­
ment. Results from the partial correlation showed that when the social
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skill variable was controlled, teacher ratings of religiousness and 
moral judgment still correlated at a statistically significant level, 
whereas peer ratings no longer did. The findings in regard to teacher 
ratings are therefore strengthened, but the results from the peer 
ratings are weakened by the information from the partial correlations. 
Correlation coefficients in this study showed that teacher and peers 
agreed between themselves at statistically significant levels on the 
relationship of religiousness and moral judgment for a given student. 
The individual agreed with his peers ' ratings of his religiousness in 
his self-rating of moral judgment. The individual's religiousness also 
related to his score on the DIT moral judgment measure.
What the multitrait-multisource matrix demonstrated was the strong 
relationship among teacher ratings, among peer ratings, and between 
teacher and peer ratings, and the generally low and inconsistent corre­
lations with self ratings. Self ratings have been shown to be unreli­
able in other investigations . In their original article Campbell and 
Fiske (1959) examined a study which involved three rating sources, 
Staff, Self, and Teammate, which are similar to the Teacher, Self, and 
Peer of this study. It was noted that the staff and teammate both 
represented the external point of view, that the ratings were averaged 
(as in the peer ratings in this study), thus minimizing individual 
biases and increasing reliability, and that the self ratings tended 
toward the favorable pole, which reduced the range of the measures.
It has been documented in other research that self-report can be un­
dependable when the self has knowledge not available to others or when 
image or personal interest is at stake, as it might well have been in
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rating one's own moral judgment, social skills, and religiousness.
It might be argued that there is considerable method variance 
present within the multitrait-multisource matrix. It was expected 
that some method variance would be evident since Campbell and Fiske 
(1959) had written of this effect in studies using rating methods.
They stated, "Within the raonomethod sections, errors of measurement 
will be correlated, raising the general level of values found, while 
within the heteromethods block, measurement errors are independent, and 
tend to lower the values both along the validity diagonal and in the 
heterotrait triangles. These effects, which may also be stated in terms 
of method factors or shared confounded irrelevancies, operate strongly 
. . . probably in all data involving ratings."
Because teacher and peers agreed not only on the religiousness and 
moral judgment of an individual student but also on his social skills, 
it might be suggested that the external observers1 ratings were the 
product of a response set or "halo" effect. That is, if a student were 
rated high in a given area, he would also tend to be rated high in 
other areas. The concept of social skills or social conformity in the 
classroom, which was included to see if subjects would distinguish it 
from religiousness and moral judgment, failed to emerge in the data as 
a separate construct. The initial finding among the correlation coef­
ficients in the multitrait-multisource matrix was that teachers and 
peers did not discriminate very much in their ratings of the three 
concepts. One preliminary explanation was that they had a tendency to 
attribute high or low marks to an individual on all three rating 
scales because of their perceptions or knowledge of the student as
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being "high" or "low" in certain traits. They might even have given 
students high or low scores based primarily on their familiarity with 
other characteristics, such as academic or athletic ability, leader­
ship skills, popularity, etc.
However, an alternative and equally plausible interpretation of 
the high intercorrelations of religiousness, moral judgment, and social 
skills when rated by teacher and peers was that the three traits, as 
assessed in this study, do relate strongly with one another and that 
they share commonality. For example, one might well expect that a 
student who behaves well at school and shows highly developed sociali­
zation is apt to have a good understanding of right from wrong and a 
commitment to justice and fairness to others, concepts which are 
related to high moral development. Certainly, for individuals with 
sociopathic personalities this expectation would not be true. One 
might also expect that consideration for others and respect for 
authority, as evaluated in the social skills scale, would also be 
characteristics of religiousness.
Results from the partial correlations suggest that teacher ratings 
of religiousness and moral judgment were independent of their ratings 
of social skills, but that the young students' ratings of religiousness 
and moral judgment were related to their ratings of social skills, 
either from a halo effect or lack of knowledge of the distinctions 
among the three variables.
Discussion will now turn to the lack of confirmation of Hypothesis 
I.B., which predicted a statistically significant correlation between 
scores on the DIT and the RBQ. It will be remembered that although the
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DIT and the RBQ correlated at low and nonsignificant levels statis­
tically, a serendipitous finding was that the DIT moral judgment test 
did correlate with statistical significance with the self rating of 
religiousness. So although Hypothesis I.B. was not confirmed by the 
single numerical value necessary, the moral judgment measure did 
indeed relate with statistical significance to a religious measure com­
pleted by each individual.
This statistically significant correlation was the sole one found 
with the DIT, a finding for which chance alone could account. It is 
striking that the only statistically significant correlation with the 
RBQ was also the self rating of religiousness. And for the SRR, 
these two statistically significant correlations were, again, the only 
ones found. Yet since the self ratings in general were so out of 
synchrony with teacher and peer ratings, it is interesting that the 
self rating of religiousness was the only measure which did happen to 
show statistically significant correlations not only with the RBQ but 
also with the DIT.
For the subjects in this study there was a high concentration at 
the upper levels of religious belief on the RBQ. And yet the public 
junior high school was especially chosen as the source of the subjects 
so as to have greater dispersion of scores than might be expected in a 
parochial or private school. It may be that the RBQ evokes generally 
high levels of religious belief, but it is more likely that the young 
subjects from the small Louisiana town in this study are on the whole 
high in religious belief. It must be remembered that religious orien­
tation is a multidimensional construct and that different assessments
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can tap different dimensions.
Another consideration is Rest's caveat that the DIT can be sig­
nificantly affected by regional differences and by the degree of dogma­
tism or humanism of one's religion. Most of the subjects in this study 
could be designated as orthodox or traditionally religious persons, 
judging from their religious affiliations. The denominations, which 
include conventional and fundamentalistic churches, are as follows: 
World Wide Church of God (1), Christ Gospel (1), Jehovah's Witness (1), 
Church of God (1), Mormon (1), Pentecostal (2), Assembly of God (3), 
Baptist (9), Methodist (5), Episcopal (1), unspecified Protestants (2), 
and Roman Catholics (7). Further research could investigate differ­
ences in religious belief and moral judgment among Catholic, mainstream 
Protestant, and fundamentalist groups. There were too few subjects in 
this study to make the appropriate comparisons.
Parenthetically, the low correlations of the DIT with other moral 
judgment ratings may be due to their sampling in two different domains: 
the process of cognitive moral reasoning in the case of the DIT and the 
content of moral knowledge and behavior in the case of the moral judg­
ment rating scale. Though an attempt was made to assess the same 
construct with the moral judgment measure, the task involved in the 
rating scale is different from that of the DIT.
The distinction between moral judgment and moral behavior is well 
documented in the literature (Rothman, 1980). Although Piaget himself 
did not research the relationship between moral judgment and moral 
behavior, he did suggest that children's active knowledge may precede 
their theoretical understanding. Thus, a child's moral behavior may be
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at a higher level than his conceptual morality. Often, however, one 
may not use his moral knowledge in real-life situations, particularly 
those involving one's self interest.
Rothman (1980) comments that the relationship between moral stage 
and behavioral choice is complex and often ambiguous. Factors that may 
affect the influence of moral reasoning on moral behavior include 
situational variables, ego-strength, affective reactions, and a per­
son's role-taking ability. Still, structuralists believe that moral 
judgment is predictive of moral behavior under certain conditions, 
whereas social learning theorists do not recognize a strong link between 
the two. Kohlberg and his colleagues have reported a greater consis­
tency between moral judgment and behavior in adulthood and at the more 
advanced moral stages.
A finding relevant to the gender differences in peer ratings will 
now be discussed. One of the results of this study was that girls rate 
other girls higher than they rate boys on religiousness, social skills, 
and moral judgment, and that these differences are statistically sig­
nificant. This finding is interpreted not so much as a bias in girls' 
ratings but probably more as an indication of fact. For example, it is 
not unreasonable to expect that girls of this age do walk through the 
hall more quietly (social skills) and participate in church-related 
activities more often (religiousness) than boys of this age. This 
interpretation is corroborated by the evidence that boys also rate 
girls higher than other boys on the three rating scales. The magnitude 
of the differences of the girl's ratings was greater than the boy's 
ratings.
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Some observations concerning the actual assessment and data- 
gathering will be made at this point. Although most of the subjects 
accepted the tests with alacrity, a few complained of the length of the
tests, especially the social skills rating scale, and the tedious
nature of rating 34 classmates on a number of items. The social skills
scale (16 items, 34 students = 544 rating decisions) was twice as
long as the moral judgment scale (8 items, 272 numerical ratings) and 
over twice as long as the religiousness scale (7 items, 238 ratings). 
Over the course of three days each student had to make 1054 ratings. 
Since the order of the tests was randomized, some of the students 
finished each day in less than the allotted time, while others labored 
to complete their ratings within the class period. A few students 
asked the meaning of words such as relevant and productively on the 
social skills scale. Since the reliability of all the rating scales 
was quite high, as shown in Tables 1 and 2, it is expected that the 
social skills scale could be shortened to one page or less and its 
wording adapted to this age level without seriously damaging its 
internal consistency. On the religiousness and moral judgment scales 
a few of the items could be reworked to reduce ambiguity. Some of the 
students protested that they had little knowledge of the habits of 
prayer, Bible reading, and church attendance of their peers for the 
religiousness rating scale.
Several students also expressed difficulty with the more abstract 
statements of the Religious Belief Questionnaire. The RBQ was some­
what disappointing in its low yield in relation to the time spent 
taking the test. It resulted in only a single numerical score with
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no other information to be drawn. If other conclusions could be 
inferred from results on the RBQ, perhaps more meaning could be derived
from its low correlation with the DIT and with teacher and peer reli­
gious ratings.
The subjects appeared to find the Defining Issues Test an easier 
task than the examiner expected. This finding was surprising since the 
subjects were at the lower end of the recommended age range. The most 
difficult part for the students seemed to be understanding how to rank 
in order of importance the twelve considerations that were first rated.
The printed instructions for this Part B of the DIT seemed confusing
even to the examiner.
These remarks about the administration of the measures are made 
chiefly for full documentation of the study. Overall, there were no 
major problems with the tests as given. However, choices of different 
religious and/or moral judgment tests might be made in future research. 
Stevens et al. (1977) had cautioned that the type of moral assessment 
used had an effect on the relationship found between religious influ­
ences and moral reasoning. Since Hypothesis I.B. was the only one not 
supported by the data, it would be interesting to see if different 
instruments would produce different results.
In considering once again the major finding of this study, that 
perceptions .of religiousness and moral judgment correlate at statis­
tically significant levels, especially between teacher and peers, it 
could be argued that self ratings might better have been emitted. The 
low and usually nonsignificant correlations with self ratings might be 
seen as intrusions into the orderly pattern of high and statistically
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significant correlations found for teacher and peers.
But in some ways, the low correlations for self ratings are the 
most interesting parts of the study, aside from the confirmation of 
Hypotheses I and I.A. The subjects in this study, at the average age 
of 13, are predominantly at the conventional moral stage according to 
their DIT scores. One could expect that as the students progress in 
cognitive development and moral development, they might also increase 
their self-perspective. For example, their self ratings might corre­
late more highly with ratings from teacher and peers. Research 
following the longitudinal development of these subjects would be 
instructive on this point.
Kohlberg has shown that individuals progress from egocentrism at 
preconventional moral levels to universal ethical considerations at 
the principled stage of moral development. Werner also has theorized 
(Langer, 1970) about the change from egocentrism to perspectivism, 
saying that there is a ", . . shift from diffuse self-perception at 
primitive stages to an articulate self-perspective at advanced stages 
of development." Through development the individual achieves greater 
detachment and acquires a transcendent capacity to see himself better 
and to adopt the perspective of others. Piaget (1970) has spoken of 
the process in this way:
The gradually emerging equilibrium between assimilation and 
accommodation is the result of successive decentratiom: 
which make it possible for the subject to take the points 
of view of other subjects or objects themselves. . . One of 
the fundamental processes of cognition is that of decentra- 
tion relative to subjective illusion, and this process has 
dimensions that are social or interpersonal as well as 
rational.
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In a future study investigating an hypothesized increase in self­
perspective, one might use a social role-taking measure to assess the 
subjects' cognitive capacity to view events from others' perspectives. 
Other suggestions for future research are to test a sample with a 
wider range of religious beliefs and to compare subjects at this age 
level in different school settings to see if the presence of religious 
education has a bearing on the results. Also recommended is a factor 
analytic study to distinguish the belief and behavioral elements in 
both moral reasoning and religiousness.
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The purpose of this activity is to find out which people in the class do certain 
things more than others. You will see 7 sentences listed down the side of the page 
and your classmates' names listed across the page. Rate each of the students as follows:
5 = If the person does the following things very often.
4 = If the person does these things a lot of the time.
3 = If the person does these things sometimes.
2 = If the person does these things a_ little of the time,
1 = If the person does these things almost never.
0 = If you don't know.
5 = Very often 
4 = A lot 
3 = Sometimes 
2 = A little 
1 = Almost never 










la m co CTi CM CO
1. Goes to church
2. Follows his/her religion in everyday life
3. Participates in church-related activities
4. Prays
5. Speaks of religion
6 . Behaves in a religious way
7. Reads the Bible
APPENDIX III
DIRECTIONS: SOCIAL SKILLS RATINGS
The purpose of this activity is to find out which people in the class do certain things 
more than others. You will see 16 sentences listed down the side of the page and your 
classmates' names listed across the page. Rate each of the students as follows;
5 = If the person does the following things almost all the time. 5
4 = If the person does these things a_ lot of the time. 4
3.= If the person does these things sometimes. 3
2 = If the person does these things a_ little of the time. 2
1 = If the person does these things almost never. 1
0 = If you don't know. 0
= Almost all the time 
= A lot 
= Sometimes 
= A little 





































!• Participates in class discussions
2. Tries to answer questions when called upon
3. Smiles when meeting friends
4. Willingly has work displayed
5. Walks through the hall quietly
6 . Undertakes new tasks with positive attitudes
7. Complies with requests of adults in authority










































9 . Knows and follows classroom rules
10. Works steadily for the required time
11. Volunteers answers to teacher's questions
12. Does seatwork assignments quietly
13. Makes relevant remarks in class discussions
14. Greets adults and peers by name
15. Finds acceptable ways to use free time




The purpose of this activity is to find out which people in the class do certain 
things more than others. You will see 8 sentences listed down the side of the 
page and your classmates' names listed across the page. Rate each of the 
students as follows:
5 = If the person does the following things almost all the time, 
4 = If the person does these things a_ lot of the time.
3 = If the person does these things sometimes.
2 = If the person does these things a little of the time.
1 = If the person does these things almost never.
0 = If you don't know.
5 = Almost all the time 
4 = A lot 
3 = Sometimes 
2 = A little 
1 = Almost never 









S3 m vo oo CM
1. Has high standards
2. Is good at determining right from wrong
3. Has a strong conscience
4. Is fair toward others
5. Says and does the same thing
6 . Is honest
7. Is unselfish








HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN A MEMBER OF THIS RELIGION? 
RELIGION OF PARENTS - FATHER:
MOTHER:
HOW MANY YEARS HAVE YOU ATTENDED THIS SCHOOL?
ANOTHER PUBLIC SCHOOL?
A CATHOLIC SCHOOL? 
ANOTHER RELIGIOUS SCHOOL? 
ANOTHER PRIVATE SCHOOL?
HOW LONG HAVE YOU KNOWN MOST OF YOUR CLASSMATES?
VITA
Kathleen Marie Trudeau Cranford was born in Fall River, Massa­
chusetts, on October 27, 1951. She was graduated from the University 
of Southwestern Louisiana in 1973 with a B.S. degree in psychology. 
She received an M.A. degree in clinical psychology from Louisiana 
State University in 1976.
104
EXAMINATION AND THESIS REPORT
Candidate: Kathleen Trudeau Cranford
Major Field: Psychology
Title of Thesis: A Multitrait-Multisource Examination of the Relationship Between
Moral Judgment and Religiousness of Eighth Grade Students
Approved:
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